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Wilson v. Ozmint
352 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Facts
On September 26,1988,James William Wilson ("Wilson") entered Oakland
Elementary School in Greenwood, South Carolina and used a stolen .22-caliber
nine-shot pistol to shoot and kill two eight-year-old elementary school children
and wound nine other children and teachers.' Wilson pleaded "guiltybut men-
tally ill" ("GBMI") to, inter alia, "two counts of murder... and one count of
illegallycarrying a firearm."2 The trial court held a three-dayhearing to determine
if Wilson met the criteria for pleading GBMI. After hearing twentyfour wit-
nesses, the trial court concluded that Wilson met the statutory standard for
pleading GBMI and allowed him to enter his plea.4
As required by South Carolina statute, the trial court offered Wlson's
defense counsel, William Nicholson ("Nicholson") and David Belser ("Belser"),
twentyfour hours to prepare for the sentencing proceeding.' Defense counsel
refused, however, and the sentencing proceeding commenced that same after-
noon.6 After considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances presented
at the GBMI hearing, the trial court sentenced Wilson to death on May9, 1989.'
1. Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847, 853 (4th Cir. 2003); se State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19,
20-21 (S.C 1992) (outlining the facts of the Oakland Elementaryshooting); MaryBrooks, GCwvm
Ope Fir iSddr. 1 De:4 10 Wd nSou65 Q WASH POST, Sept. 27, 1988, at A3, at 1988
WL 2027456. One child died the day of the shooting, and the other victim died three days later.
SeardOldDif As Rult fSdol ShodtV, DALLAS MORN. NE vs, Sept. 30, 1988, at 12A, at 1988
WL 5323941. The Fourth Circuit issued its initial opinion on December 17, 2003, and subsequently
amended part IV of its opinion in its order of February 17,2004, denying Wilson a rehearing. Se
firma part HI.C; Wilson v. Ozmint, No. 03-3, 2004 WL 292143, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004)
(denying a rehearing and amending part IV of the panel opinion of December 17, 2003).
2. Wdsci, 352 F.3d at 853; seeS.C C0DE ANN. S 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (requiring
for a GBMI plea that the defendant show "because of mental disease or defect he laciked sufficient
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law").
3. Wdscm, 352 F.3d at 853-54; swS.C CODE ANN. S 17-24-20(D) (A court maynot accept
a plea of guilty but mentally ill unless, after a hearing, the court makes a finding upon the record
that the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that when he committed the crime
he was mentally ill as provided in Section 17-24-20(A).").
4. WIson, 352 F.3d at 854.
5. Id; swS.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 2003) ("The [sentencing] proceeding
must be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable after the lapse of
twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant.").
6. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 854.
7. Id
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Wilson was denied relief by the Supreme Court of South Carolina on direct
appeal and denied post-conviction relief ("PCR") in South Carolina state court.8
In June of 2002, Wilson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.9 Although the
magistrate judge recommended rejection of all Wilson's claims under 28 U.S.C.
5 2254, the district court, without reviewing the case under S 2254, found eight
constitutional errors in the state court proceedings and granted Wilson's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 0 The State of South Carolina appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit and Wilson cross-appealed.1'
I. Hdding
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred by not reviewing Wl-
son's habeas petition under the standards of 28 U.S.C S 2254.12 The court next
applied S 2254 and found that the state court judgments were not "contraryto"
and did not involve "an unreasonable application of" federal law.3 The Fourth
Circuit remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss Wilson's
petition."
III. A mlsis
A. Distict C t's Failw toApp yAEDPA
The court began its analysis byciting the district court's failure to reviewthe
state court determinations under the standards of 28 U.S.C S 2254, part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 ("AEDPA). 5 The court
found that the district court determination was "of little, if any, relevance to the
proper disposition of Wlson's petition" due to its failure to apply the proper
standard.16 Under S 2254(d) (1), a writ of habeas corpus can onlybe granted if the
state court determination "was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law."17 The court further noted that even if
8. Id; see Wdson, 413 SE.2d at 29 (denying Wilson relief on direct appeal).
9. Wilsig 352 F.3d at 854.
10. Id at 854-55; see 28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (providing for the filing and review of federal
habeas petitions; part of AEDPA).
11. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 854.
12. Id at 855; see 28 U.S.C S 2254 (discussing federal habeas corpus applications filed
pursuant to state court decisions; part of AEDPA).
13. Wdscn, 352 F.3d at 855, 872; 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1).
14. Wdsrar 350 F.3d at 872.
15. Id at 854-55; se 28 U.S.C S 2254 (stating the proper standard for granting a writ of
habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
16. Wdscr, 352 F.3d at 855.
17. 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000).
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a writ of habeas corpus is granted, the petitioner must still showthat, under Bmckt
v A bralamc4n,1 the constitutional errors " 'had substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the verdict' rendered by the jury."19 Next, citing Wdiarr v
Ta)Wod ° for the proper interpretation of S 2254, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to
analyze the state court proceedings under AEDPA itself, rather than remanding
to the district court.21
B. MitiionIssu
The district court found that Wson's trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to notify him that one of the defense's expert witnesses had changed his
opinion about Wilson's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime.2 ' Dr.
Donald Morgan ("Dr. Morgan") initially testified that Wilson was not insane at
the time of the offense but later, after hearing others testify, changed his opinion
and told Belser that he believed Wilson was insane at the time of the shootings.23
The PCR court did not consider Dr. Morgan's reasons for changing his opinion
convincing and also found Dr. "Morgan's testimony at the PCR hearing was
tainted due to his personal opposition to Wilson's sentence of death, animus
towards Dr. Dietz, the state's expert witness, and subsequent involvement with
Wilson's defense team during the post-conviction proceedings."24 The Fourth
Circuit found that under S 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), the state PCR court's factual
determinations concerning Dr. Morgan's credibilitywere not "objectivelyunrea-
sonable" and that Wilson failed to present "clear and convincing" evidence to the
contrary.
2 5
18. 507 U.s. 619 (1993).
19. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 855 (alteration in origina) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619,637 (1993)); seeBrecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619,637 (1993) (providing that a writ of habeas
corpus cannot issue without a showing of" 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict'" because of the constitutional errors (quoting Katteakos v. United
States, 328 US. 750, 776 (1946))). The court previously applied the "substantial and injurious
effect" test in Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 682 (4th Cir. 2002), a case decided after the passage
of AEDPA. Wdso, 352 F.3d at 855. The court in Fulluadgranted relief when the jurywas shown
to have considered extraneous material during deliberations. Fdluwd, 290 F.3d at 682.
20. 529 US. 362 (2000).
21. Wlisen, 352 F.3d at 855; sw Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (providing
guidance for applying S 2254 when reviewing federal habeas petitions).
22. W&Mdsc 352 F.3d at 857.
23. Id
24. Id at 858.
25. Id; see28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(2), (e)(1) (2000) (providing, when read together, for the grant
of habeas relief upon clear and convincing evidence that the state court judgment relied on an
erroneous factual determination; part of AEDPA).
2004]
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The Fourth Circuit next found that the district court erred in granting
habeas relief on two of Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.26 First,
Wilson argued that Nicholson and Belser should have presented additional
mitigation evidence beyond that presented at the GBM[ hearing." The Fourth
Circuit found that the state court's application of Strickland u Washimig 28 the
applicable federal law for determining ineffective assistance, was not "objectively
unreasonable." The court found that Wlson's trial counsel made a legitimate
strategic choice not to present additional mitigating evidence at sentencing."
Further, the court noted that Nicholson and Belser had conducted a "substan-
tial" investigation into Wilson's familyhistoryand possessed enough information
to make a reasoned judgment whether to present additional evidence.31 The
court concluded that any additional witnesses would have been redundant and
that the state PCR court properly denied Wilson relief on this issue.32
Wilson's second claim alleged that Nicholson and Belser were ineffective
because they did not hire a social worker to compile a social history report.3
Wilson specifically noted the significance of the holding in Wiirs u Snith,34 in
which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a decision not to compile
a social history report amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel." The
Fourth Circuit distinguished Nicholson and Belser's investigation from the
limited investigation conducted in Win by citing Nicholson and Belser's
extensive research into Wilson's family and social history.3 6 The court ruled that
Nicholson and Belser's investigation allowed them to make a " 'reasonable
professional judgment'" about whether to hire an outside researcher to expand
26. Wdscr 352 F.3d at 860.
27. Id at 861.
28. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. Wisap 352 F.3d at 861; Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668,687 (1984) (establishing
a two-pronged test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel; see Wiam, 529 U.S. at 409
(stating that for a state court determination to be "an unreasonable application" of federal law, it
must be objectively unreasonable).
30. W'dm4 352 F.3d at 862.
31. Id
32. Id at 862-63. Wilson also claimed that his counsel were ineffective for not presenting
evidence in mitigation that medication caused his "stony-faced" appearance. Id at 863. The court
rejected this claim because Nicholson and Belser reasonably decided to present evidence that his
"stony-faced" appearance was due to his mental illness rather than medication. Id at 864.
33. Id at 864.
34. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
35. Wsor, 352 F.3d at 864; see Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Q. 2527, 2538 (2003) (finding that
defense counsel's failure to compile social historyreports violated prevailing professional norms and
was thus ineffective assistance of counseD.
36. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 864.
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on what they already knew.37 The court distinguished between a situation in
which counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence, as in Wiim, with a
situation in which counsel investigated but did not use the fruits of the research,
as in Wilson's case.38 The court concluded that the state PCR court was not
"objectivelyunreasonable" in finding Nicholson and Belser's investigation to be
an adequate basis for a reasoned strategic decision.
C The QCRB Report
The Fourth Circuit addressed two issues concerning a report bythe Quality
Care Review Board ("QCRB"), which detailed Wlson's treatment in state-run
mental health facilities." On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, Wilson gained access to the report and made a motion for the court to
defer consideration of the issue of its relevance to the defense so that defense
counsel could review the report with its experts.4 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina ruled on all of Wilson's other claims and the issues
concerning the QCRB report did not reappear until PCR proceedings.42 The
South Carolina PCR court ruled on substantive and procedural grounds that
Wilson could not raise his claims because they were not exhausted on direct
appeal.43 In its opinion issued on December 17,2003, the Fourth Circuit found
that the PCR court was correct in refusing to hear Wilson's claims in PCR
proceedings because the claims were either improper for failure to exhaust state
court remedies or procedurally defaulted." The court ruled that this failure
"deprived the state courts of the 'opportunity to correct [the] constitutional
violation' that he now alleges in federal court."4"
On February 17, 2004, the Fourth Circuit issued an order denying Wilson
a rehearing and amending its opinion of December 17.46 The court's order
changed the portion of its December 17 opinion concerning the QCRB report. 7
In his petition for rehearing, Wilson made two separate claims concerning the
37. Id at 865 (quoting Stikar 466 U.S. at 690).
38. Id at 864-65.
39. Id at 865-66.
40. Id at 866-67.
41. Id at 866.
42. Wdsrt, 352 F.3d at 866-67.
43. Id at 867; se'Drayton v. Evatt, 430 S.E.2d 517,519 (S.C 1993) (holding that PCRcourts
cannot hear claims asserted for the first time that could have properly been raised at trial or on
direct appeal).
44. Wdso, 352 F.3d at 867.
45. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).
46. Wilsor, 2004 WL 292143, at *1.
47. IdL at *2.
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report: (1) the trial court's in camera review of the QCRB report was improper,
and (2) the PCR court improperly quashed his subpoena of the QCRB report.48
The Fourth Circuit first ruled that the in camera review of the trial court
was proper "because Wilson's counsel invited the trial court's action."49 In its
December 17 opinion, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the state PCR court that
Wilson's claim challenging the in camera review was improper for failure to
exhaust state court remedies.0 However, in its order issued February 17, the
court ruled that this claim was not barred because of the "unusual circumstances"
involved in Wlson's case."' The court noted that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina granted Wilson's motion to defer ruling on the QCRB report until post-
conviction proceedings. 2 The Fourth Circuit found that the grant of the motion
removed Wilson's circumstances fromthose governed bythe South Carolina rule
barring claims not raised on direct appeal." In this case, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina explicitly allowed what the rule prevents."4 The court ruled that
Wilson became "an 'exceptional case in which exorbitant application of a gener-
ally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a
federal question.'",s Instead, the court agreed with the PCR court's alternative
procedural grounds, and held that Wilson was barred from raising the claim
because his trial counsel invited the trial court's in camera consideration of the
QCRB report. 6 The court found that " 'the failure to object to proceedings
below waives the presentation of those issues on appeal' or 'in post-conviction
absent an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.' ,"7 The court found
that this was "an adequate and independent basis" on which the state PCR court
grounded its decision to reject Wilson's claim."
48. Id at *3.
49. Id
50. Id; se Simmons v. State, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (S.C. 1975) ("Generally, post-conviction
hearing statutes do not afford relief in the case of alleged errors for which remedies were available
before and during the original trial ...." (internal citations omitted)).
51. idsor, 2004 WL 292143, at *4.
52. Id at *3.
53. Id
54. Id at *4.
55. Id (quoting Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002)).
56. Id
57. Wsc, 2004 WL 292143, at *4 (alteration in original (quoting Cummings v. State, 260
S.E.2d 187, 188 (S.C. 1979)); seeState v. Robinson, 147 S.E. 441, 443 (S.C. 1929) ("Defendant's
counsel is therefore in no position to complain as to matters... not onlywithout objection on his
part, but when solicited by him").
58. Wdsn, 2004 WL 292143, at *4. The court also concluded that this holding was unaf-
fected by the Supreme Court of South Carolina's grant of Wilson's deferral motion because his




The court next addressed Wlson's contention that the PCR court improp-
erly quashed his subpoena of the QCRB report.5 9 Because the court ruled that
Wilson's claim was not procedurally defaulted, the court reviewed the PCR
court's quashing of Wilson's subpoena on the merits." The Fourth Circuit
found that the PCR court's decision to quash was not " 'contraryto'" federal law
or " 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented.' "61 The Fourth Circuit noted that the PCR court rejected Wilson's claim
because the QCRB report "contained neither exculpatorynor mitigating evidence
that was undisclosed in a different form."62 The court concluded that this
analysis was consistent with the applicable federal lawto be applied under Skoper
' South GVm 6 3 even though the state PCR court did not mention the holding
in Skoperdirectly."4 The court found that the PCR court's decision was neither
"contraryto" federal law nor an "unreasonable determination of the facts" under
applicable United States Supreme Court precedent."
D. PauraDl fDa
The court next addressed the State's contention that the district court erred
in granting relief to Wilson on his claim that he was not competent to enter a
plea of guilty." The State did not claim on appeal that Wilson procedurally
defaulted his competency claim."' The court noted that Wilson's competency
claim would have been procedurally barred had the State raised it as an issue, but
because it failed to do so, the Fourth Circuit exercised its discretion and reviewed
59. Id at *5.
60. Id
61. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)).
62. Id
63. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
64. Wson 2004 WL 292143, at *5; se Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)
(holding that refusal to allowpresentation of good behavior while incarcerated "deprived petitioner
of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment"); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (requiring that in capital cases " 'the sentencer ... not be
precluded from considering, as a nitigaiwjaaor, any aspect ofa defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death' " (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 605 (1978))). The Supreme Court has
explicitly held that a lower court need not cite the applicable authority as long as the decision is not
inconsistent with it. SeEarlyv. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) ("Avoiding [a violation of S 2254(d)(1)
does not require citation of our cases- indeed, it does not even require amn s of our cases, so
long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.").
65. Wdscr 2004 WL 292143, at *5-*6. The Fourth Crcuit concluded that even if the PCR
court's conclusion had been unreasonable, anyerror was harmless under Bmbraand did not amount
to a "substantial and injurious effect" on the ultimate decision whether to impose the death penalty.
Id at *6-*7 (citing Bsuz 507 U.S. at 637).
66. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 867-68.
67. Id at 868.
20041
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Wilson's claim "on the merits."68 The Fourth Circuit found that the trial court
properly determined Wilson's competence to enter his plea and its decision was
not "objectively unreasonable."69
E. Esdz'g Stardas UrnerAEDPA
The only claim Wilson raised to the Fourth Circuit was that the death
penalty "constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment' under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments" when inflicted on someone judged to be lacking
"'sufficient capacityto conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.'- 70
The court first cited L odeyer v A rdradi' for the proposition that the applicable
federal law is the law that governed " 'at the time the state court reached its
decision.' "72 In 1992 the applicable United States Supreme Court precedent for
determining an Eighth Amendment violation was Pemy v Lyau." Under
Perys two-pronged test a petitioner must show that either (1) "the punishment
was considered 'cruel and unusual' at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted"; or (2) that" 'evolving standards of decency,'" as determined by
"'objective evidence,'" are violated byinfliction of the punishment in question."
Wilson conceded the first prong of the test but challenged the second prong
because objective evidence proved that a national consensus against executing the
mentally ill existed." Wilson did not offer evidence from" 'the time the state
68. Id at 868. The court noted that it is within the discretion of the appeals court "whether
'to decide a petitioner's claim on the basis of procedural default despite the failure of the state to
properlypreserve the procedural default.'" Id (quoting Yearts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255,261 (4th
Car. 1999)).
69. Id at 869-70.
70. Wldson, 352 F.3d at 870 (quoting S.C CODE ANN. S 17-24-20(A));seeU.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment); US. CONST. amend. XIV
(providing that "[no State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"). It should be noted that this claim should be differentiated from a caim brought
under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), which held that a state may not execute an
insane or incompetent prisoner, and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), which held that
it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute the mentally retarded.
71. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
72. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
71-72 (2003)); seeLockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (finding that" 'clearlyestablished
Federal law' under S 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the
Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision").
73. Wdscn, 352 F.3d at 870; sePenryv. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 330-31 (1989) (establishing
two-pronged test for determining cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
74. Wdson 352 F.3d at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Pemr; 492 U.S. at 330-31). In
A deim, the United States Supreme Court applied the Peoy test and found that a national consensus
among the state legislatures, in conjunction with other factors, made the execution of the mentally
retarded unconstitutional. Atkim, 536 U.S. at 321.
75. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 870-71.
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court [rendered] its decision,' " but instead offered contemporary statistics to
prove the existence of a national consensus.76 The court noted unfavorably
Wlson's use of contemporaneous statistics rather than evidence from 1992 but
found that even Wilson's contemporaneous evidence did not show a national
consensus.' After finding Wilson's evidence of a national consensus unpersua-
sive, the court ruled that the Supreme Court of South Carolina was not "objec-
tively unreasonable" in finding the execution of someone unable to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was not a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.
78
IV. Appli m V*Uza
A. Wiggins Issue
Wdson illustrates the contours of the Wigirs holding and how the Fourth
Circuit intends to apply it. The court distinguished between cases like Wii,
in which defense counsel predicated a strategic decision on virtuallyno investiga-
tion, and cases like Wdson, in which defense counsel conducted an adequate
investigation and decided not to use the information gathered.79 This outcome
emphasized the fact that Wtibzr does not make a failure to present all possible
mitigating evidence ineffective assistance of counsel."0 Instead, the Wdsoncourt
found that the investigation need onlymeet reasonable professional standards to
justify strategic choices.8 '
B. Intitatzic f Tal Cct A acion
Defense counsel must be aware of all procedural mechanisms for denying
claims on appeal no matter how obscure or seemingly technical. The Fourth
Circuit barred Wilson's claim that the trial court's in camera reviewwas improper
because Wilson's trial counsel "invited the trial court's action." 2 Because of this
invitation, the court ruled that Wilson could not make his claim on direct appeal
76. Id at 871 (alteration in original (quoting Loaeye, 538 U.S. at 71-72).
77. Id The court noted that, at best, Wilson's statistics showed that the various states were
evenly divided over the issue of executing the mentally ill. Id at 872.
78. Id; see 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing that federal habeas relief is not available
unless a state court made a determination that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States"; part of AEDPA); Willia, 509 U.S. at 409 (finding that federal habeas relief is available
only if the state court determination was "objectively unreasonable").
79. WMIsaqn 352 F.3d at 864-65; se Wz is, 123 S. Ct. at 2538 (finding that defense counsel's
failure to compile social history reports amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel).
80. Wzlsc, 352 F.3d at 865 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795 (1986)).
81. Id
82. Wdso, 2004 WL 292143, at *3.
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or in PCR proceedings. 3 This outcome is analogous to the Supreme Court of
Virginia's recent decision in PoeM uv Cawmun th,54 in which the court denied
Powell relief on a claim that venirepersons should have been dismissed after
being exposed to a prejudicial voir dire question posed bydefense counsel.85 The
court ruled that because defense counsel posed the question, any error was
invited and Powell could not raise an objection on appeal. 6 The court concluded
that Powell should not benefit from his trial counsel's strategic choice. 7 Because
the rule stated in Poue/! is similar to the rule in Wilson against appealing actions
of the trial court invited by trial counsel, the Fourth Circuit will likely apply the
same bar to federal review in similar Virginia cases.
C A widiE Pro dwafl Dadt
Wldon provides another warning that defense counsel should be constantly
aware of procedurally defaulting or failing to exhaust claims in state court.
Wilson's competency claim was not procedurally defaulted per se because the
State did not raise a procedural default claim in the federal habeas proceedings. 8
The Fourth Circuit noted the power it retained to recognize the default, but did
not exercise that discretion m this case. 9 Instead, the court determined Wilson's
claim on the merits and denied relief.9 Defense counsel should not count on
courts regularly exercising their discretion in this manner and should avoid
procedurally defaulting any claims in state court.
D. Ireistible lnq se
Unlike South Carolina, Virginia does not allow a defendant to plead GBMI.
Virginia does, however, have a limited irresistible impulse insanity defense. A
claim of "irresistible impulse is solely a question of ability to control behavior
known to be wrong."9' The determination of irresistible impulse is focused on
83. Id
84. 590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004).
85. SeePowell v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 559-60 (Va. 2004) (ruling that the cause
of the potential jurors' grounds for dismissal was Powell's question and that the jurors were not
required to be dismissed under the "invited error" doctrine). For a discussion and analysis of Poudl,
se gerdy Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 591 (2004) (analyzing Powell v.
Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)).
86. PoudA 590 S.E.2d at 560.
87. Id
88. Wf/son, 352 F.3d at 868.
89. Id
90. Id at 870.
91. ROGERD. GROOT, CQIMINALOFFENSES AND DEFENSES INVIRGINIA 463 (West 2004).
An irresistible impulse claim should be distinguished from a claim that the defendant could not
differentiate between right and wrong, which is subject to Virginia's form of the M'Nagkm test.
[Vol. 16:2
WILSON V. OZMINT
the mind of the defendant at the precise moment that the crime occurred.' In
Ro/im u Cnrmnmltb," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that if the act was
planned in advance it was not a result of an irresistible impulse.94 Also, an
mabilityto conform one's conduct to the requirements of the law can be used as
a mitigating factor at sentencing." Virginia allows the execution of defendants
like Wilson because death can be imposed even if the jury finds the inability-to-
conform mitigator. Although technically different, the South Carolina and
Virginia laws are virtually indistinguishable in actual result.
V. Cancuion
It is essential for defense counsel to understand the limits of the holding of
Wiom in the Fourth Circuit. Wzi does not require the presentation of all
possible mitigating evidence; Wi only requires an investigation adequate
enough to be the basis of a strategic choice. Wson also emphasizes the impor-
tance of remaining vigilant against the possibilityof procedural default and failure
to exhaust state court remedies. Valid claims may be lost for federal habeas
review without proper attention being paid at the state court level. Finally, Wihon
illustrates the technical distinction between South Carolina and Virginia in
matters of mental competence, although the distinction is virtually meaningless
in actual result.
Terrence T. Egland
Id at 461-63; se Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 868 (1871) (restating and
adopting the test for insanity in M?'agb*b; M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (HL. 1843)
(establishing the test for determining whether a defendant was insane at the time of the offense).
As is required in Virginia, Wlson was first determined to be sane within the M'Wagn test before
an analysis of whether he fit within the definition of mentallyill in section 17-24-20(A) of the South
Carolina Code. Wdson, 352 F.3d at 857; seS.C. CODE ANN. 5 17-24-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2003)
(requiring for GBMI plea that the defendant show "because of mental disease or defect he lacked
sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law").
92. GROO)T, s"pra note 91, at 463-64; s& Dejamette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 878
(1881) (providing a definition of irresistible impulse as "a sudden paroxysm of violence, venting
itself in homicide... upon friend and foe indiscriminately").
93. 151 S.E.2d 622 (Va. 1966).
94. GRoOT, s"pra note 91, at 464; see Rolins v. Commonwealth, 151 S.E2d 622, 625 (Va.
1966) (holding that, as a matter of law, if the act was planned in advance it was not a result of
irresistible impulse).
95. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (vfichie Supp. 2003) (stating that "[flacts in
mitigation may include ... at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
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